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COMES NOW, the Appellant, above-named, by and through his counsel
of record, Dee W. Smith, and responds to the State's Appellate Brief as
follows:
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The State has argued in Point I of its brief that since it was the Defendant
who introduced his prior bad acts on direct examination he cannot challenge
their admission on appeal. The State relies on the United States Supreme Court
decision found in Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000). The Appellant
recognizes that Ohler and the case at bar are very similar.

However, the

majority's reasoning in Ohler was neither logical nor cogent. For this reason,
this Court should not rely on the Supreme Court's opinion in Ohler as it
decides this case.
This Court does not have to follow the United States Supreme Court
when it interprets the Utah Rules of Evidence. In State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638
(Utah 1996), this Court transferred the case to the Utah Supreme Court to
determine whether Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993) stated a different standard for admitting evidence pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 than the standard under Utah Rule of Evidence
702 as was articulated in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).
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The Utah Supreme Court noted that Rimmasch was decided four years
prior to Daubert and had proven to be effective in guiding trial courts in
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d
at 642. The Utah Supreme Court also recognized that its interpretation of Utah
Rule of Evidence 702 in Rimmasch was based, in part, on Utah case law which
superimposed a more restrictive test when scientific evidence is at issue. Id.
The Court held "that Rimmasch sets forth the proper standard for admitting
scientific evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 702." Id.
In the case of State v. Fedorowicz, 52 P.3d 1194 (Utah 2002), the Utah
Supreme Court stated in a footnote that "[although the Federal Rules of
Evidence are a separate body of law from the Utah Rules of Evidence, if the
reasoning of a federal case interpreting or applying a federal evidentiary rule is
cogent and logical, we may freely look to that case, absent a Utah case directly
on point, when we interpret or apply an analogous Utah evidentiary rule." Id.
atfn. 1.
Although the federal rule is identical to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, the federal rules are a separate body of law from the Utah rules. This
Court can apply the reasoning from a federal case interpreting a rule of
evidence if that reasoning is cogent and logical. The reasoning in Ohler is
neither cogent nor logical and should not be used as a guide in this case.
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As the dissent in Ohler noted "[t]he holding is without support in
precedent, the rules of evidence, or the reasonable objectives of trial . . ."
Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. at 760(dissenting opinion).
In the case at bar, the trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence
of Defendant's prior convictions as part of its case in chief. Although it elected
not to do that, the Defendant was subject to cross-examination on his prior
convictions if he testified. The Defendant did testify and, as the State has
acknowledged, he testified that he had been to prison for distributing
marijuana. (R. 495/162). On cross-examination the State pointed out that there
were four convictions altogether. (R. 495/167). Then during the State's closing
argument the prosecutor mentioned the convictions again. (R. 496/49).
The holding in Ohler forces a defendant to choose whether he will
exercise his right to testify on his own behalf, thus increasing his chances of an
acquittal or to not testify and maintain his appeal rights. Such a policy is
contrary to common sense and efficient judicial administration.
The dissent in Ohler was cognitive of this fact when it stated;
It is true that when convictions are revealed only on crossexamination, the revelation also warns the factfinder, but the
timing of their disclosure may do more. The jury may feel that in
testifying without saying anything about the convictions the
defendant has meant to conceal them. The jury's assessment of
the defendant's testimony may be affected not only by knowing
that she has committed crimes in the past, buy by blaming her for
not being forthcoming when she seemingly could have been.
Creating such an impression of current deceit by concealment is
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very much at odds with any purpose behind rule 609, being
obviously antithetical to dispassionate factfinding in support of a
sound conclusion. The chance to create that impression is a
tactical advantage for the Government, but only in the majority's
dismissive sense of the term; it may affect the outcome of the
trial, but only if it disserves the search for truth. Ohler v. United
States, 529 U.S. at 764(dissenting opinion).
The Supreme Court's holding in Ohler is also contrary to the scholarship
on the subject. See, e.g., 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § J_8, p. 836 (Tillers rev.
1983) ("[A] party who has made an unsuccessful motion in limine to exclude
evidence that he expects the proponent to offer may be able to first offer that
same evidence without waiving his claim of error"); M. Graham, Handbook of
Federal Evidence § 103.4, p. 17 (1981)("However, the party may . . . himself
bring out evidence ruled admissible over his objection to minimize its effect
without it constituting a waiver of his objection"; 1 McCormick, supra, § 55 at
246 ("[W]hen [a party's] objection is made and overruled, he is entitled to treat
this ruling as 4the law of the trial' and to explain or rebut, if he can, the
evidence admitted over his protest."); D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal
Evidence § 11, p. 65 (1977)("Having done his best by objecting, the adversary
would be indeed ill treated if then he was held to have thrown it all away by
doing his best to protect his position by offering evidence of his own").
The dissent in Ohler correctly pointed out that "[t]he general thrust of
the law of evidence, then, not only fails to support the majority's approach, but
points rather clearly in the other direction." Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. at
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763 (dissenting opinion). A criminal defendant should not have to choose
between trying to win the trial or winning an appeal. "Allowing the defendant
to introduce the convictions on direct examination thus tends to promote
fairness of trial without depriving the Government of anything to which it is
entitled. There is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the
conviction herself. . ." Id. at 764 (dissenting opinion).
Since the majority opinion in Ohler is neither logical nor cogent and is
contrary to common sense, the scholarship on the subject, and efficient judicial
administration this Court should reject the Supreme Court's holding in Ohler
and find that a defendant does not waive his right to appeal from an adverse in
limine ruling if he introduces the evidence himself.
POINT II
The State has argued in its reply brief that under the first prong of the
Franks/Nielsen test articulated in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986),
that the Defendant has failed to show that Officer Machielson made a "false
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth . . ."
See, Appelle's Br. P34-35. The evidence is clear that Officer Machielson
included misleading information in an attempt to strengthen the affidavit.
He called a report from an anonymous, refused complainant an
"intelligence report, making no mention of the fact this report was an
uncorroborated anonymous report." What is even more troubling about this
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part of the affidavit is that it was clear that Officer Machielson had been
involved with the Riverdale case, had made an arrest on that case and didn't
believe that the Defendant was a suspect in the case. Officer Machielson
admitted that someone had been prosecuted and convicted in that case and that
as far as he knew, the Defendant was not a suspect. (R. 494/248-49). This is
clearly a showing that there was a false statement in the affidavit that at the
very least was made with a reckless disregard for the truth.
The trial court found that even without the "intelligence reporf there
was probable cause. The trial court indicated that what was most significant
was "the fact that the police are able to have a confidential informant go in,
make three different purchases from the defendant.. ." (R. 490/31-32).
The problem with this conclusion is that the confidential informant was
not reliable and the information in the affidavit concerning this informant was
inaccurate and misleading. The affidavit specifically stated that the informant
had worked for several different agents of the Strike Force for several years and
had provided information that had led to several arrests and convictions. This
information was false. The informant testified at trial that he became involved
with the Strike Force because the Defendant was causing problems for a
neighbor and that Agent Machielson was the first agent he was introduced to.
(R. 493/164-65). The affidavit also failed to mention that the informant was
being paid for the work he was doing for the Strike Force.
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The State has argued in footnote four of its reply brief that these issues
are procedurally barred since they were raised for the first time on appeal. See,
Appelle's Brief, P.35, fn. 4. While the State is correct that unpreserved issues
cannot be raised on appeal absence a plain error or ineffective assistance claim,
the issue of the adequacy of the search warrant affidavit was properly raised in
the trial court. In State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the
State made the same argument that an issue surrounding a suppression motion
had not been adequately briefed in the trial court. This Court disagreed and
stated that "the constitutionality of the roadblock in question was precisely the
ground raised below, and although defendant's argument emphasized a
statutory argument, the constitutionality of this roadblock was also adequately
briefed and presented. Moreover, the constitutionality question was the precise
basis of the trial court's ruling." Id. at 1129.
Likewise, the sufficiency of the search warrant affidavit was the precise
issue that Defendant raised in the trial court. He briefed and argued that the
misleading statements caused it to be defective and that the evidence should
therefore be suppressed. Since the issue was adequately preserved this Court
should find that the affidavit was deficient and the trial court's denial of the
motion should be reversed.
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POINT III
The Defendant did not waive his right to appeal the trial court's denial
of cross-examination of Russ Hartley concerning specific instances of conduct.
Defendant's trial attorney made the argument under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence that he should be allowed to cross examine Mr. Hartley concerning
specific instances of conduct. The trial court clearly denied the Defendant's
request to cross-examine Mr. Hartley on these matters. See, R. 493/282. The
trial judge did state, "I guess if you want to find a case for me that's right on
point that says firing somebody for embezzlement constitutes untruthfulness,
I'll certainly take a look at it and reconsider in the morning." (R. 493/282).
The fact that the Defendant did not find a case "right on point" does not
preclude him from raising the issue on appeal. It is unreasonable to expect a
defendant to be able to spend hours researching case law in the middle of a trial
for a case "right on point." There are numerous issues that arise during a trial
where there is no case law "right on point." In fact, a computer search of Utah
case law brings up zero cases with the words Rule 608 and embezzlement in
the same sentence.
Here, the trial court incorrectly applied Rule 609 requirements, did not
consider the facts concerning Mr. Hartley's conduct and whether they
constituted a specific instance of untruthfulness and also failed to do a Rule 403
analysis. Just because Defendant did not find a specific case on point after the
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judge ruled the evidence was inadmissible does not preclude him from
challenging that denial on appeal. The plain language of Rule 608 is very clear.
The trial court simply abused its discretion by not allowing cross-examination
of Mr. Hartley^ past conduct that was probative of his character for
untruthfulness.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant's constitutional rights were repeatedly violated both
before and during his trial. For these reasons, he respectfully requests this
Court to reverse his convictions.
DATED this V day of May, 2004
DEE W. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant
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